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The Concept of Mind (1949) is a book by the philosopher Gilbert Ryle. In it, he describes what he saw as a "fundamental mistake" made by Descartes' dualism, which underlies much of western philosophy. In the work, Ryle coined the phrase, "the dogma of the ghost in the machine," to refer to Descartes' model.

The fundamental error, according to Ryle, is a category mistake made when philosophers talk about mind and matter as if they were, "... terms of the same logical type." Ryle claims that while it makes sense to talk about mental processes and events, that the

"... phrase 'there occur mental processes' does not mean the same sort of thing as 'there occur physical processes,' and, therefore, that it makes no sense to conjoin or disjoin the two."

For Ryle, Cartesian dualism mistakingly assumes it is sensible to ask of a given cause, process, or event, whether it is mental or physical (with the implication that it cannot be both).

Examples in Ryle's text illustrate this concept. A prospective student who visits a university and sees the library, the labs, the sports arena, may ask the tour guide, "but where is the university?," having been under the assumption that it is a different place altogether. According to Ryle, the student fails to realize that "university" and "library" are terms that belong to different logical categories.

In the Introduction, Ryle claims his purpose is to correct the logical geography of the knowledge that we already possess about mental powers and mental operations. Also, he declares that he is determining the logical cross-bearings of concepts. In so doing, he metaphorically compares such knowledge to the reading of a map. This activity displays the logic of the propositions that are used to communicate the concepts. Such logic is, for him, a spatial metaphor that reveals how propositions consistently precede and follow concepts.

Descartes' idea, for example, of the separation of mind and body presents the facts that belong to one category in the peculiar language that is appropriate to another category. Ryle wants to relocate the facts, not deny them. For him, every concept legitimately belongs to a certain category. He defines categories as logical types. The way that a concept belongs to a category (logical type), is the same as a set of logically legitimate ways of operating mentally. Ryle tries to show how mental operations occur that violate logical rules. Thus, Ryle thinks of philosophy as replacing bad category habits with a lawful discipline.

Selected Quote

If my argument is successful, there will follow some interesting consequences. First, the hallowed contrast between Mind and Matter will be dissipated, but dissipated not by either of the equally hallowed absorptions of Mind by Matter or Matter by Mind, but in quite a different way.... It will also follow that both Idealism and Materialism are answers to an improper question. The "reduction" of the material world to mental states and processes, as well as the "reduction" of the mental states and processes to physical states and processes, presuppose the legitimacy of the disjunction "either there exist minds or there exist bodies (but not both)". It would be like saying, "either she bought a left-hand and a right-hand glove or she bought a pair of gloves (but not both)".

– Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind

Schopenhauer

Ryle's assertion that the workings of the mind are not distinct from the actions of the body comes from Schopenhauer's influence. The workings of the will are one and the same as the workings of the body, according to Schopenhauer^[1]. In the section called "The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I',"^[2] Ryle asserted that a person who speaks of "I" or "Self" does not really know that of which he/she speaks. He has "failed to catch more than the flying coat–tails of that which he was pursuing." This is reminiscent of Schopenhauer's statement, "For the ego that represents, thus the subject of knowing, can itself never become representation or object, since, as the necessary correlative of all representations, it is their condition."^[3] Also, Ryle's claim that the nature of a person's motives are defined by that person's actions in a situation is also an example of Schopenhauer's influence. A person's empirical character, Schopenhauer said, is made evident only by that person's actions.

As a student he read Schopenhauer, and much later, in his fiftieth year—having, he thought, forgotten Schopenhauer almost entirely—published The Concept of Mind, in which not only the central thesis, but the essentials of the subsidiary theses come straight out of Schopenhauer. Ryle genuinely believed he was putting forth his own ideas. Only when someone pointed it out after publication did he realize he had recycled Schopenhauer.

– Bryan Magee, Confessions of a Philosopher, Ch. 16

Notes

1. ^ "But I say that between the act of will and the bodily action there is no causal connection whatever; on the contrary, the two are directly one and the same thing perceived in a double way, namely in self–consciousness or the inner sense as an act of will, and simultaneously in external spatial brain–perception, as bodily action." Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, § 21.
2. ^ Chapter VI. Self–Knowledge. Section 7.
3. ^ Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, § 41.

Bibliography

• Ryle, Gilbert (2000-12-15) [1949]. The Concept of Mind (New University of Chicago Press edition 2002 ed.). University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-73296-7.  
• Magee, Bryan, [1997], Confessions of a Philosopher, Random House. ISBN 0-375-50028-6
• Schopenhauer, Arthur, [1974], On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Open Court. ISBN 0-87548-187-6