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Key moments in the history of World War II were accompanied by controversial command decisions, the earliest of which concerned the surrender of Singapore, Britain’s "impregnable fortress" in the Far East. It was overrun by a numerically inferior force after only six days of fighting and surrendered on 8 February 1942, being the the largest surrender of British-led forces in history. The rapidity of Singapore's unconditional surrender came as a big surprise to the Japanese invasion force. As recorded by General Yamashita in his diary, the Japanese 25th Army at Singapore had by then almost run out of ammunition, and was outnumbered by more than three to one. In Yamashita's words, the attack on Singapore was "a bluff". A determined counter-offensive at that point would have stopped the invaders in their tracks.[1] More than 90,000 British, Australian and Indian troops were condemned to spend the next three years in misery as Japanese prisoners of war, and 25,000 ethnic Chinese suspected to be communist partisans were summarily executed. In an angry protest cabled to British prime minister and defence minister Winston Churchill, the Australian government described the fall of Singapore as "an inexcusable betrayal". >ref< Quoted in S Woodburn Kirby, Singapore: The Chain of Disaster, London: Cassell 1971, pp.224-5, 252. </ref> To this day the British Foreign Office refuses to say why official documents in the 1941 Japan files at the Public Record Office remain closed to public scrutiny until the year 2016. Even then, the 75-year embargo may be renewed.[2] The charge of "betrayal" is neither rebutted nor mentioned at all by Churchill in his own voluminous account of the war. [3]

Contents

Charge of Western "betrayal"

The charge of "betrayal", whether justified or not, appears in a somewhat different context in the nomenclature of Soviet historians. Controversial Western command decisions are collectively referred to by them as "betrayal" of the Soviet Union by its Western Allies in the fight against Hitler. [4] The notion of Western "betrayal" is explicit also in the work of Western revisionist historians. They argue that by land, sea and air, the Western Allies deliberately failed to deploy their overwhelming military advantages to good effect while Russia suffered appalling losses as a result, on the eastern and decisive front of World War II. [5] Stalin's earliest misgivings over the conduct of the war by the West Allies are documented in secret correspondence between Stalin and Churchill in mid-1942. This was after Churchill had suddenly suspended the Anglo-American Arctic convoys carrying essential war materials from the West to the northern ports of Russia. Churchill told Stalin on 18 July that the convoys were “too dangerous", and to attempt further Arctic convoys at that time, "would bring no benefit to you and would only involve a dead loss to the common cause". Stalin replied: "No major task can be carried out in wartime without risk or losses. You know of course that the Soviet Union is suffering far greater losses." [6] By 13 August, Stalin was bluntly telling Churchill that their alliance had taken "an improper turn" in the refusal of Churchill to open a promised front in western Europe. This refusal, in Stalin’s words, had “delivered a moral blow” to the Soviet Union. [7] Churchill defended his position by arguing there were nine German divisions in France, making it impossible for the Western Allies to launch a concerted ground offensive in western Europe. Stalin countered with the observation that there was "not a single German division in France of any (fighting) value." [8] Classified German documents captured later by the Western Allies show that the stationing of German troops in the campaign against Russia on the eastern front generally precluded effective defence in the west. [9] It would have drawn off an appreciable share of Hitler's forces from the Russian-German front, making it possible for the Red Army to deal a decisive blow which would either have crushed Germany immediately or made certain its defeat within a reasonably short period. In Hitler's own words, a major Allied landing in western Europe in mid-1942 would have brought the Germans "to a generally critical position". [10]

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The missing front

Red Army leader Marshal Georgi Zhukov

When a second front was eventually opened in Europe commencing with the invasion of Normandy by the Western Allies on D-Day on 6 June 1944, the actions of the Allied Expeditionary Force under the supreme command of General Dwight Eisenhower were characterised by plodding restraint in the face of ideal attack conditions and comparatively inferior enemy numbers. The Germans managed to muster only 319 aircraft against 12,837 of the Western Allies whose military strength soon increased to the point where they had effective superiority of 20 to one in tanks and 25 to one in aircraft. The cross-channel build-up provided the Expeditionary Force with at least twice the number of men, four times the number of tanks, and six times the number of aircraft available to the enemy. Western allies were fielding 91 full-strength divisions against 60 weak German divisions whose overall strength was roughly equal to only 26 complete divisions. [11] The invasion force, consisting of British, American and Canadian troops, thus engaged less than a third of the total number of German divisions in France, while the Red Army engaged 185 enemy divisions in the east. [12] Red Army commander Marshal Georgy Zhukov noted that for every German division engaged by the Western armies, the Red Army met three. In terms of armoured units alone, of the roughly 5,000 tanks available to Germany, more than 4,000 were deployed on the eastern front. [13] So obvious was the disparity, most of the German divisions having been deployed to fight the Soviet forces on the eastern front, that in real terms a western front hardly even existed. Major General John Kennedy, then Assistant Chief of the General Staff, expressed deep disappointment with the way the Western Allied offensive was being run. He wrote: "For six weeks or so, (after the invasion) the Germans did not attempt or even desire to move their divisions in the Pas de Calais or elsewhere towards the scene of action in Normandy." [14] A determined ground attack at that point by the Allied Expeditionary Force, according to British Vice-Chief of General Staff, General Sir David Fraser, "might have finished the war, with incalculable strategic and political consequences, and with a saving of the huge number of casualties suffered later ... it was the last chance to seize this great strategic opportunity. It failed, and the war went on." [15]

Secret Surrender in Italy

In March 1945, months before Germany officially capitulated in Europe, a series of secret negotiations codenamed Operation Sunrise commenced in Switzerland between representatives of the Western Allies and representatives of the German High Command in Italy, headed by General Karl Wolff, commander of the SS or Schutzstaffel in northern Italy.[16] The objective of these meetings behind the back of the Soviet Union was to forestall a takeover by Italian communist resistance forces in northern Italy and to hinder the potential there for post-war influence of the civilian communist party.[17] The outcome of these meetings was a surrender to the Western Allies on 2 May 1945 of nearly 1,000,000 troops from 22 German and six Italian Fascist divisions in northern Italy, before the war in the rest of Europe had ended. Operation Sunrise had been coordinated principally by American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) head Allen Dulles, who was later to become director of the US Central Intelligence Agency.[18] The Germans took advantage of an agreed suspension of hostilities during the secret meetings to transport several army divisions from northern Italy to the Soviet front where the Red Army was still in the process of advancing on Berlin.[19] The affair caused a major rift between Stalin and Churchill, and in a letter to Rooseveld on 3 April Stalin complained that the secret negotiations did not serve to “preserve and promote trust between our countries.”[20] Field Marshal Pietro Badoglio, fascist Italy's former Chief of General Staff and number one on the United Nations list of war criminals, was welcomed ceremoniously by the Western Allies as a "co-belligerent". His "honourable capitulation" from the Axis had been secured on the understanding that Badoglio’s past crimes would simply be wiped off the slate. [21] Dulles, in return for their early surrender to the West and to the West alone, had promised the German negotiators that none of them would be prosecuted for war crimes. One of the principal participants in the negotiations was Milan Gestapo chief Walter Rauff whose responsibility under the Nazis was to conduct anti-communist operations in Italy. .[22] He was recruited by Dulles to work for OSS and was later assisted by Dulles’s contacts to escaped from Italy to Argentine as a fugitive from war crimes prosecution.[23] The Americans proceeded to subsidise and install a regime of collaborators and Nazi sympathizers, while the role in civil society of former anti-fascist partisans was quickly nullified by the Allied Military Government in Occupied Territories and by the Allied Control Commission. Communist and liberal elements, particularly those in the Italian labour movement, became radically marginalised.[24]

Notes and references

Footnotes

  1. ^ Yamashita quoted in Noel Barber, Sinister Twilight: The Fall of Singapore, London: Collins, 1969 pp.58, 156-7.
  2. ^ Stan Winer, Between the Lies, London: Southern Universities Press, 2007 [Chapter 2, "The Betrayal of Singapore" accessible online at http://truth-hertz.net ]
  3. ^ Winston S Churchill, The Second World War, (6 vols) London: Cassell, 1948-1954.
  4. ^ Vladimir Petrov (ed.), Soviet Historians and the German Invasion, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press 1968; Y Larionov, N Yeronin, B Solovyov, V. Timokhovich, World War II Decisive Battles of the Soviet Army, Moscow: Progress 1984, p.452
  5. ^ e.g. Gar Alperovitz, "How Did the Cold War Begin?" in Walter LaFeber (ed.) The Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947, New York: John Wiley 1971; Alexander Werth, Russia at War 1941-1945, New York: Avon 1965; DF Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins: 1917-1960, New York: Random 1961; Stan Winer, Between the Lies, (2nd edn., London: Southern Universities Press 2007, [Chapter 4 "The Missing Front", accessible online at http://www.truth-hertz.net ]
  6. ^ Stewart Richardson (ed.),The Secret History of World War II: Wartime Letters and Cables of Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill, New York: Richardson and Steirman, 1986, pp.6, 38
  7. ^ Richardson, op cit, p.46.
  8. ^ Richardson, op cit, pp. 6, 38.
  9. ^ Gordon Harrison, "The European Theatre of Operations: The Cross Channel Attack" in K.R. Greenfield (ed.) The US Army in World War II, (Official History) Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army: US Government Printing Office 1951, p.141ff.
  10. ^ Trumbull Higgins, Winston Churchill and the Second Front, New York: Oxford University Press, 1957, p.167-8.
  11. ^ Günter Bischof, Die Invasion in der Normandie 1944, Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2002; Basil Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War,London: Cassell 1965, p.559
  12. ^ John Erickson, Stalin's War With Germany, (2 vols) London: Grafton, 1985
  13. ^ Georgi Zhukov, Reminiscences and Reflections, (2 vols), Moscow: Progress 1985, Vol II, pp.307, 334, 338, 345-7.
  14. ^ John Kennedy, The Business of War,London: Hutchinson 1957, p.325
  15. ^ David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them: The British Army in the Second World War, London: Hodder and Stoughton 1983, p.348.
  16. ^ Bradley F Smith and Elena Agarossi, Operation Sunrise: The Secret Surrender. New York, 1979.
  17. ^ R Harris Smith, OSS, Berkely: University of California Press, 1972, pp.114-121
  18. ^ R Harris Smith, op cit, p.363.
  19. ^ Richardson, op cit, p.255.
  20. ^ Richardson, op cit, p.264.
  21. ^ Simpson, Christopher, Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988, p.91.
  22. ^ Harris Smith pp.117, 119
  23. ^ Declassified US intelligence files quoted by investigator John Loftus, Boston Globe, 28 May 1984
  24. ^ Wittner, op cit.,

" at the Yalta Conference: Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin]] Western betrayal or Yalta betrayal are terms often used [1] in many Eastern and Central European countries but especially in Poland and the Czech Republic which refers to the foreign policy of several Western countries, which violated allied pacts and agreements during the period from the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 through World War II and to the Cold War, as rooted in hypocrisy and betrayal.[2]

The "betrayal" refers to the fact that the western Allies—in spite of having promoted democracy and self-determination, signing pacts and forming military alliances prior and during World War II—nonetheless betrayed their Central European allies by abandoning these pacts, for example by not preventing Nazi Germany from invading and occupying Czechoslovakia (Munich Betrayal) or abandoning its Polish ally during the Invasion of Poland (1939)[3] and 1944 Warsaw Uprising.[4] Western powers also signed the Yalta agreement and after the World War II did nothing or very little to prevent these states from falling under the influence and control of Soviet communism. In addition, during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Hungary received neither military nor moral support from the Western powers during the uprising, which was eventually suppressed by the Soviet Army.[5] The same scenario was repeated in 1968 when communist armies of Warsaw Pact nations led by the Soviet Army invaded Czechoslovakia to crush the Prague Spring changes in the governing Communist system.

As far as the Yalta Conference is concerned, the concept is disputed by those historians who argue that Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Winston Churchill and President of the United States Franklin Roosevelt had no option but to accept the demands of their ally Soviet premier Joseph Stalin in Tehran and later in Yalta. However, there were some misjudgments of the power of the Soviet Union by the Western powers, much like the case with Nazi Germany a decade before. Supporters of Yalta are sometimes outraged at the notion that Yalta was a "betrayal" of Eastern and Central Europe without considering the fate of Poland. Polish forces had fought the Nazis longer than any country since the beginning of the Second World War. They fought alongside the U.S., British and Soviet troops in most major campaigns[6] in Europe, including the final battle of Berlin, with the strength of the Polish Armed Forces in the West peaking at 249,000 (out of 4 million Western allies), 180,000 in the East (out of over 6 million Soviets) and over 300,000 in underground[7] AK.[8][9] In the final stage of war the Polish troops on all the European fronts, excluding the Home Army, amounted to some 600,000 soldiers[10] (infantry, armored troops, aircraft and navy). This made the Polish Armed Forces the fourth largest after the Soviet Union, United States and British Armed Forces.[11][12] The Polish government in exile was an official ally of the U.S. and Britain. All this did not prevent Roosevelt from acquiescing in the dismantlement of this Allied government and its replacement with a puppet communist government. Even as the men of the Polish 1st Armoured Division, determined to link up with the American 90th Division under Gen. George S. Patton's Third Army and to close the trap on Nazi armies in Normandy, were battling the German Army and the Hitler Youth SS Panzer division,[13] Roosevelt was planning to hand Poland over to Stalin.[14]

Other historians suggest that Churchill urged Roosevelt to continue military action in Europe but against the Soviet Union to prevent the USSR extending its control beyond its own borders. Roosevelt apparently trusted Stalin's assurances and declined to support Churchill's intention of ensuring the liberty of all Europe outside the USSR. Without US backing, the exhausted, near starving and near bankrupt UK could not take action. Even with US backing, the result of action against the Soviet Union was very uncertain (see Operation Unthinkable).

Contents

Diplomacy and Central Europe between the wars

Starting in 1919, it was the policy of France to construct a cordon sanitaire (quarantine line) in Eastern Europe that was designed to contain both the Germans and Soviets and their ideologies, which were metaphorically compared to diseases. The crushing of Béla Kun's Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919 by the combined forces of Romania, Czechoslovakia, and France was an early example of an enforcement of the cordon sanitaire. In 1921, France signed a defensive alliance with Poland committing both states to come to each other's aid in the event of one of the powers being attacked by another European power. In 1924, the French signed a similar defensive alliance with Czechoslovakia, in 1926 with Romania and in 1927 with Yugoslavia.

In 1925, the French signed new treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, which tightened the levels of military co-operation between the signatory states. In addition, the French tried to turn the Little Entente of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia which had been set up as an anti-Hungarian alliance in 1921 into an anti-German alliance. In 1921, Poland and Romania signed a defensive alliance. This was as close as Poland came to joining the Little Entente. The French would have preferred to also see Poland a member, but antagonism between Czechoslovakia and Poland doomed the idea.

Beyond the Covenant of the League of Nations, Britain had no defence commitments in Eastern Europe in the 1920s and made clear that they wanted to keep it that way. In 1925, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain had stated in public that the Polish Corridor was "not worth the bones of a single British grenadier".[15][16]

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, a complicated set of alliances was established amongst the nations of Europe, in the hope of preventing future wars (either with Germany or Soviet Russia). In 1932 and again in 1934, Poland signed a 10 year non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. Also in 1932, the Soviets signed ten-year non-aggression pacts with Finland, Estonia and Latvia. In January 1934, Germany and Poland signed a ten-year non-aggression pact. In 1935, the Soviets signed treaties of alliance with France and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty committed the Soviets to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia if attacked by a neighbor provided France did first.

In November 1933, there were rumours in Paris that a "preventive war" option against Germany was being considered by the French, Belgian and Polish governments. The British historian Lewis Bernstein Namier claimed later that the Poles had proposed a preventive war to the French at this time, but the French declined the offer. However, there is no evidence in the French, Belgian or Polish archives that a "preventive war" was considered in 1933.

Austria

In the Betrayal of the Cossacks at Lienz, Cossacks of the XVth SS Cossack Cavalry Corps of the Waffen-SS were forcibly delivered to areas of Germany controlled, at the end of WWII, by the Soviet Union. Cossacks had been fighting the Russian government since the Third Russian Revolution.

Croatia

During the final days of the war, large numbers of refugees from Nazi-abandoned Russia and Croatia were fleeing from the Red Army and Tito's Communist partisans.

On May 15, 1945 the Croatian Home Guard, the Ustaše, the XVth SS Cossack Cavalry Corps and the remnants of the Serbian State Guard, and the Serbian Volunteer Corps, surrendered to British forces. The Croatians attempted to negotiate a surrender to the British under the terms of the Geneva Convention, but were ignored. The Independent State of Croatia had joined that Convention on January 20, 1943, and was recognised by it as a "belligerent", that is, as a national state with armed forces in the field. All the signatories of the Convention, including the United Kingdom and the United States, were informed that this recognition had been given.[17] On May 5, in the town of Palmanova (50 km northwest of Trieste), between 2,400 and 2,800 members of the Serbian Volunteer Corps surrendered to the British. On May 12, about 2,500 additional Serbian Volunteer Corps members surrendered to the British at Unterbergen on the Drava River.

On May 11 and 12, British troops in Klagenfurt, Austria, were harassed by arriving forces of the Yugoslav Partisans. In Belgrade, the British ambassador to the Yugoslav coalition government handed Tito a note demanding that the Yugoslav troops withdraw from Austria. On May 15, Tito placed Partisan forces in Austria under Allied control. A few days later he agreed to withdraw them. By May 20, Yugoslav troops in Austria had begun to withdraw.

Around June 1, the Croatian Home Guard, the Ustaše, and the XVth SS Cossack Cavalry Corps who surrendered to the British were turned over to the Yugoslav Communist forces as part of what is sometimes referred to as Operation Keelhaul. The Communists proceeded to execute the POWs in what became known as the Bleiburg massacres.

The Croatian POWs were executed while the survivors were marched back to newly proclaimed Communist Yugoslavia.

Czechoslovakia

See also: History of Czechoslovakia Before World War II (1938 – 1939) and later sections

The term Western betrayal (Czech: zrada Západu) was coined after the Munich Conference (1938) when Czechoslovakia was forced to cede part of its area (Sudetenland) to Germany. Czech politicians joined the newspapers in regularly using the term and it, along with the associated feelings, became a stereotype among Czechs. The Czech terms Mnichov (Munich), Mnichovská zrada (Munich betrayal), Mnichovský diktát (Munich Dictate) and zrada spojenců (betrayal of the allies) were coined at the same time and have the same meaning. Winston Churchill himself said: "Britain and France had to choose between war and dishonor. They chose dishonor. They will have war".

During World War II, Czech propagandists from the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (Emanuel Moravec, for example) employed the term to justify collaboration with Nazi Germany.Template:Fact

During the post-war 1946 parliamentary campaign, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia argued (with much success) that the historical unreliability of Western allies must be countered by closer relations with the Soviet Union.Template:Fact

After the Communist Party assumed all power in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the betrayal was frequently referenced in propaganda. This interpretation of history was official and the only one allowed.

After the Communist Party lost its power in the 1989 Velvet Revolution, official use of the term stopped. Though the word "betrayal" is almost out of common use, the term "Munich" as well as "About us - without us" together with the overall feelings of having been abandoned by the West repeatedly in 1938 (Munich), 1945-48 (Communist coup d'etat) and 1968 (Prague Spring, and subsequent Soviet invasion) are still quite deeply imprinted in Czechs' minds.

Poland

First World War aftermath

After the First World War, Poland regained independence after 123 years of partitions. While the victorious Western allies proclaimed their support for an independent Poland, they primarily wanted to weaken Germany and the Soviet Union.Template:Fact As a result, their actual support was limited. One instance was the affair of Silesia. Many French and British politicians desired the industrial region of Silesia to remain part of Germany, so that Germany would have an easier time paying the Great War reparations to France and its allies. Britain provided no aid to Poland during the 1921 Silesian Uprisings. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, a plebiscite was to be held to determine which areas of ethnically mixed Silesia were to be ceded to Poland and which were to remain with Germany. In some districts of Upper Silesia, the majority of the people were Polish and opted for Poland; the majority in the rest of Upper Silesia opted for Germany. After the plebiscite, the Germans balked at handing over any part of Upper Silesia, claiming that the Versailles treaty did not call for partitioning Silesia by districts. The German interpretation was that the majority of people in Silesia had chosen Germany and so all of Silesia should remain with Germany. The German view was supported by Britain. In fact, Versailles did clearly state that Upper Silesia was to be partitioned by districts after the plebiscite.[18][19]

However, France and the French military in Silesia generally took a pro-Polish stance during the 1921 Polish uprising. In the years immediately after World War One, it was French policy to weaken Germany as much as possible, and though the French did not champion the border that the Poles wanted in Silesia, the French attitude to the Polish cause in regard to the Silesian dispute was markedly pro-Polish and anti-German. Indeed, it was an ultimatum from Paris that compelled the Germans to withdraw their forces from Silesia in June 1921.

Ostensibly, the British view that all of Silesia ought to remain with Germany was based on the belief that it would allow Germany to more easily pay reparations to France; by 1921, London had largely abandoned any claims against Germany and was strongly pressuring both France and Belgium to lower their reparations claims against the Germans as much as possible. The British argument about reparations was mostly a bid to influence French public opinion; the real reason for London's pro-German stance was the belief that if Germany were to lose too much territory, this could undermine the fragile Weimar Republic and lead to extremists taking power in Germany. Thus, British policy towards Silesia in 1921 was largely motivated by the desire to consolidate German democracy. Though the British were prepared to support an interpretation of Versailles that violated both its letter and its spirit, and though the Poles were understandably angry with London's pro-German view in this matter, it is very hard to justify referring to the British refusal to support the Polish rebels in Silesia as a "betrayal" as Britain had never made any commitments to do so.

During the Polish-Soviet War (1918-1921), there was a debate among western politicians which side they should support: the White Russians (representing the former Imperial Russia loyalists), the new Bolshevik revolutionaries, or newly independent countries trying to regain their territory at the expense of the powers that lost the First World War. Eventually, France and Britain decided to support the White Russians and Poland; however, their support to Poland was limited to the few hundred soldiers of the French military mission. Further, when it seemed likely in early 1920 that Poland would lose the war (which did not happen), Western diplomats encouraged Poland to surrender and settle for large territorial losses (the Curzon line).

In July 1920, Britain announced it would send huge quantities of World War One surplus military supplies to Poland, but a threatened general strike by the Trades Union Congress who objected to British support of "White Poland" ensured that none of the weapons that were supposed to go to Poland went any further than British ports. The British Prime Minister David Lloyd George had never been enthusiastic about supporting the Poles, and had been pressured by his more right-wing Cabinet members such as Lord Curzon and Winston Churchill into offering the supplies. The threatened general strike was for Lloyd George a convenient excuse for backing out of his commitments. The French were hampered in their efforts to supply Poland by the refusal of Danzig (modern Gdańsk, Poland) dockworkers to unload supplies for Poland. Likewise, French efforts to supply Poland via land were hindered by the refusal of Czechoslovakia and Germany (both which had border disputes with Poland) to allow arms for Poland to cross their frontiers.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, a complicated set of alliances was established amongst the nations of Europe, in the hope of preventing future wars (either with Germany or Soviet Russia). With the rise of Nazism in Germany, this system of alliances was strengthened by the signing of a series of "mutual assistance" alliances between France, Britain, and Poland (Franco-Polish Alliance and Anglo-Polish Alliance). This agreement stated that in the event of war the other allies were to fully mobilize and carry out a "ground intervention within two weeks" in support of the ally being attacked[20][21][22]

Up to 1939

Diplomacy

In the years following the end of World War I and the Polish-Soviet War, Poland had signed alliances with many European powers. The most important were the military alliance with France signed on February 19, 1921 and the defensive alliance with Romania of March 3, 1921. The alliance with France was a major factor in Polish inter-war foreign relations, and was seen as the main warrant of peace in Central Europe; Poland's military doctrine was heavily influenced by this alliance as well.

As World War II was nearing, both governments started to look for a renewal of the bilateral promises. This was accomplished in May 1939, when general Tadeusz Kasprzycki signed a secret protocol (later ratified by both governments) to the Franco-Polish Military Alliance with general Maurice Gamelin. It was agreed that France would grant her eastern ally a military credit as soon as possible. In case of war with Germany, France promised to start minor land and air military operations at once, and to start a major offensive (with the majority of its forces) not later than 15 days after the declaration of war.

On March 30, 1939, the government of the United Kingdom pledged to defend Poland, in the event of a German attack, and Romania in case of other threats. The reason for the British-issued "guarantee" of Romania and Poland was a panic-stricken ad hoc reaction to rumours (later proven to be false) of an imminent German descent on Romania in late March 1939. A German seizure of oil-rich Romania would ensure that in any future Anglo-German war, a British naval blockade would not starve Germany of oil. From London's point of view, it was imperative to keep the oil wells of Romania out of German hands. The British "guarantee" was primarily intended to block a German move against Romania; Poland was added to the "guarantee" almost as an after-thought.Template:Fact Only in April 1939 did it become evident that the next German target was Poland.Template:Fact

The British "guarantee" of Poland was only of Polish independence, and pointedly excluded Polish territorial integrity. "The reasons for the guarantee policy are nowhere more clearly stated than in a memorandum by the Foreign Office, composed in the summer of 1939, which submitted that it was essential to prevent Hitler from "expanding easterwards, and obtaining control of the resources of Central and Eastern Europe," which would enable him "to turn upon the Western countries with overwhelming force. "".[23] The basic goal of British foreign policy between 1919-1939 was to prevent another world war by a mixture of "carrot and stick". The "stick" in this case was the "guarantee" of March 1939, which was intended to prevent Germany from attacking either Poland or Romania. At the same time, the Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax hoped to offer a "carrot" to Adolf Hitler in the form of another Munich type deal that would see the Free City of Danzig (modern Gdańsk, Poland) and the Polish Corridor returned to Germany in exchange for a promise by Hitler to leave the rest of Poland alone. Template:Fact

This declaration was further amended in April, when Poland's minister of foreign affairs Colonel Józef Beck met with Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax. In the aftermath of the talks, a mutual assistance treaty was signed. On August 25 the Polish-British Common Defence Pact was signed as an annex to Polish-French alliance. Like the "guarantee" of March 30, the Anglo-Polish alliance committed Britain only to the defence of Polish independence. It was clearly aimed against German aggression. In case of war, United Kingdom was to start hostilities as soon as possible; initially helping Poland with air raids against the German war industry, and joining the struggle on land as soon as the British Expeditionary Corps arrived in France. In addition, a military credit was granted and armament was to reach Polish or Romanian ports in early autumn.

On May 4, 1939, a meeting was held in Paris, at which it was decided that the fate of Poland depends on the final outcome of the war, which will depend on our ability to defeat Germany rather than to aid Poland at the beginning. Poland's government was not notified of this decision, and the Polish–British talks in London were continued. A full military alliance treaty was ready to be signed on August 22, but His Majesty's Government postponed the signing until August 25, 1939.

At the same time secret German-Soviet talks were held in Moscow which resulted in signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in the early hours of August 24. The full text of the treaty, including the secret protocol assuming a partition of Poland and Soviet military help to Germany in case of war, was known to the British government thanks to Hans von Herwarth, an American informer in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yet, Poland's government was not informed of this fact either.[24]

The Phony War

Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, Britain and France declared war on Germany after ultimatums to withdraw expired on September 3. However, some other items of the March 30 guarantee pledge were violated; most notably the failure to respond with an overland invasion from the West. The pledge would not have obliged France and the United Kingdom to declare war on the Soviet Union due to the actual wording of the pact that specifically named Germany as the potential aggressor. This was kept secret for diplomatic reasons.Template:Fact. The United Kingdom and France enforced a naval blockade on Germany and seized German ships starting with the declaration of war.

, head of the French Military Mission to Poland]] According to the Franco-Polish military convention, the French Army was to start preparations for the major offensive three days after the mobilisation started. The French forces were to effectively gain control over the area between the French border and the German lines and to probe the German defences. On the 15th day of the mobilisation (that is on September 16), the French Army was to start a full scale assault on Germany. The pre-emptive mobilisation was started in France on August 26, and on September 1, the full mobilisation was declared. A French offensive in the Rhine river valley area (Saar Offensive) started on September 7. Eleven French divisions (out of 102 being mobilized) advanced along a 32 km line near Saarbrücken with negligible German opposition. However, the half-hearted offensive was halted after France seized the Warndt Forest, three square miles of heavily-mined German territory. At the same time the U.K., who promised to start air-raids on German industry as soon as possible, conducted a number of air raids against the German Kriegsmarine on September 4 1939, losing 2 Wellington and 5 Blenheim bombers in the action.[25][26] During those first days of the war Royal Air Force Whitley night bombers also dropped propaganda leaflets on German cities, taking great care to ensure that the leaflets were not dropped tied together so that they would be spread out to the maximum number of readers possible. On September 11, the leaflet raids were halted.

Both the pre-war reports of the Polish intelligence and the post-war testimonies of German generals (most notably of Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl) reported that there was an equivalent of less than 20 divisions facing France in 1939, as compared to roughly 90 French divisions. On the other hand, German orders of battle show 33 infantry divisions, plus eleven newly raised infantry divisions, plus the equivalent of six border guard divisions, all under command of Army Group C. Similarly, most of the Luftwaffe and all armoured units were then in Poland while the Siegfried Line was severely under-manned and far from completed. Knowing all of the above, the Polish commanders expected that the French offensive would quickly break the German lines and force the OKW to withdraw a large part of its forces fighting on Polish soil back to German western frontier. This would force Germany to fight a costly two-front war.

The French assault was to be carried out by roughly 40 divisions, including one armoured division, three mechanized divisions, 78 artillery regiments and 40 tank battalions. All the necessary forces were mobilised in the first week of September. On September 12, the Anglo-French Supreme War Council gathered for the first time at Abbeville in France. It was decided that all offensive actions were to be halted immediately. By then, the French divisions have advanced approximately eight kilometres into Germany on a 24 kilometres long strip of the frontier in the Saarland area. Maurice Gamelin ordered his troops to stop not closer than 1 kilometre from the German positions along the Siegfried Line. Poland was not notified of this decision. Instead, Gamelin informed marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły that half of his divisions are in contact with the enemy, and that French advances have forced the Wehrmacht to withdraw at least six divisions from Poland. The following day, the commander of the French Military Mission to Poland, General Louis Faury, informed the Polish Chief of Staff, General Wacław Stachiewicz, that the planned major offensive on the western front had to be postponed from September 17 to September 20. At the same time, French divisions were ordered to retreat to their barracks along the Maginot Line. The Phony war started. The French remained in control of a pocket in the Saarland. As a symbolic gesture, the 1st Polish Grenadier Division later raised in the French Army was stationed to occupy this German territory.

The Allied attitude towards Poland in 1939 has been a subject of an ongoing dispute among historians ever since. Some historians argue that if only France had pursued the offensive agreed on in the treaties, it would have definitely been able to break through the unfinished Siegfried Line and force Germany to fight a costly two-front war that it was in no position to win. At the same time, others argue that France and Britain had promised more than they would deliver — especially when confronted with the option to declare war on the Soviet Union for violating Poland's territory on September 17, 1939 the way they had on Germany on September 3, 1939 (though in fact the pledge would not have obliged France and the United Kingdom to declare war on the Soviet Union due to the actual wording of the pact that specifically named Germany as the potential aggressor) — and that the French army was superior to the Wehrmacht in numbers only. It lacked the offensive doctrines, mobilization schemes, and offensive spirit necessary to attack Germany. Also, while the bulk of the Luftwaffe's bomber force was engaged in Poland (most of the fighter units were in the West), neither the French airforce nor the British Royal Air Force engaged in any operations against Germany beyond leaflet droppings and the bombing of German naval bases.Template:Fact

It is unlikely, given Soviet strategic doctrine of opportunistic war that they would have carried on with invasion of Poland fulfilling their promises given to Germans. Template:Fact Though Germans asked Russians to invade Poland on September 3 no such action took place till September 17, 1939. This is partly because the Soviet Union waited for a proof of Poland's collapse as well as lack of military involvement on the part of the Allies Template:Fact.

The problem with Polish expectations was that the French and British commitments greatly exaggerated their capabilities. Although France promptly declared war, the French mobilization was not complete until early October, by which time Poland had fallen. In Britain where mobilization was more rapid, only 1 in 40 men were mobilized (compared to 1 in 10 in France, and 1 in 20 in Poland), thus providing only a token force against Germany's forces of several million. The presumption that "something could have been done but wasn't" overlooks the basic fact that the West, just like Poland, was ill-equipped to fight Germany even with the majority of German forces engaged in the east. After the war, General Alfred Jodl commented that the Germans survived 1939 "only because approximately 110 French and English divisions in the West, which during the campaign on Poland were facing 25 German divisions, remained completely inactive."

In the end, many Poles believe that although Poland held out for five weeks, three weeks longer than was planned, it received no military aid from its allies, the United Kingdom and France. Additionally Poland never surrendered to either the Germans or Russians. The agreed upon "two week ground response" never materialized, and it is contended that Poland fell to the Nazis and the Soviets as a result. It is uncertain whether the British or French had any real capacity to launch a successful offensive on the German-French border before mid-October 1939. Nevertheless, an offensive within a two-week timeframe was what they had promised the Polish government.

Aftermath

After the hostilities ended, German propaganda tried to win Poles and ensure collaboration by underlining that Poland was abandoned by her allies, and that the only world order that could ensure peaceful and prosperous life for the Poles was the German Reich.Template:Fact These claims were even strengthened by the French cease-fire signed in 1940 which was a clear violation of the alliance (both parties agreed not to sign any unilateral agreements with Germany).

Similar slogans were expressed by the Soviet Union propaganda until 1989. The official propaganda in all Eastern Bloc countries stated that Poland was betrayed and the only ally Poland could rely on was the Kremlin.Template:Fact

1940s

Atlantic Charter

Soon after the Third Reich had invaded the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa, the Polish government in exile signed a pact with Joseph Stalin. Although the Poles wanted a declaration that all pacts the USSR had signed with the Nazis were null and void, Stalin refused to consider any suggestion that he surrender the territory he seized consequent to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. It was for Poland that Britain entered the war in the first place and Britain was sympathetic to Polish interests. Britain nonetheless pressured the Poles to withdraw this demand, since, in Churchill's words, "We could not force our new and sorely threatened [Soviet] ally to abandon, even on paper, regions on her frontier which she regarded for generations as vital to her security." The Polish government-in-exile, (based in London,) conceded but only after Britain agreed to state in writing that all agreements which adjusted Poland's pre-war borders were null and void. The Soviet-Polish agreement was signed on July 30, 1941, and Anthony Eden formally notified the House of Commons of the arrangements that same day. In response to a parliamentary question about Britain's commitment, however, Eden stated that "The exchange of notes which I have just read to the House does not involve any guarantee of frontiers by His Majesty's Government."

The Poles were more successful in obtaining Soviet agreement to the creation of the Polish Army in the East, and obtaining the release of Polish citizens from the Soviet labor camps. Despite the difficulties the Soviet government made, many were freed from confinement and permitted to join the Polish Army formed formally on August 12, 1941. However, after the troops were withdrawn to the Middle East in March 1942, Stalin revoked the amnesty and in June and July arrested all Polish diplomats in the USSR.

Meanwhile, on September 24, 1941, Poland's government-in-exile and the Soviet Union signed the Atlantic Charter. It underlined that no territorial changes should be made that would not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. It was viewed by the Polish government as a warrant of Poland's borders, although it became apparent that some concessions would have to be made.

In December 1941, a Conference was held in Moscow between the USSR and the United Kingdom. Stalin proposed to base post-war Polish western borders on the Oder-Neisse Line and demanded that the United Kingdom accept the pre-war western borders of the Soviet Union. Anthony Eden accepted the demand as he assumed that the border in question was the 1939 line.Template:Fact However, Stalin apparently meant the 1941 border with Germany. It was soon discovered, but British government decided not to change the document. On March 11, 1942, Winston Churchill notified the Prime Minister of the Polish government-in-exile, Władysław Sikorski, that the borders of the Baltic States and Romania were guaranteed, and that no decision was made regarding the borders of Poland.

Katyn and the Soviet pressure

.]] From the very beginning of Polish-Soviet talks in 1941, the government of Poland was searching for approximately 20,000 Polish officers missing in Russia. Stalin always replied that they either must have fled to Mongolia or are somewhere in Russia, which is a big country and it's easy to get lost hereTemplate:Fact. In April 1943 German news agencies reported finding mass graves of Polish soldiers as a result of Katyn massacre. The Polish government requested the Soviet Union examine the case and at the same time asked the International Red Cross for help in verifying the German reports.

On April 24, 1943, Sikorski met with Eden and demanded Allied help in releasing Polish prisoners in the gulags and Soviet prisons. Sikorski also declined the Soviet demand that Poland withdraw their plea to have the Red Cross investigate Katyn. Anthony Eden refused to help and the Soviet Union broke diplomatic relations with Poland on the following day, arguing that the Polish government was collaborating with Nazi Germany. Despite Polish pleas for help, the United States and the United Kingdom decided not to put pressure on the USSR.

After the Soviets stopped the German advance on the Eastern Front, Poland lost its significance as the main Eastern ally. This was made obvious by the German defeat at Stalingrad.

Tehran

In November 1943, the Big Three (USSR, USA, and UK) met at the Tehran Conference. Both Roosevelt and Churchill officially agreed that the eastern borders of Poland would roughly follow the Curzon Line. The Polish government was not notified of this decision and the only information given was the press release claiming that We await the day, when all nations of the world will live peacefully, free of tyranny, according to their national needs and conscience. The resulting loss of the "eastern territories", approximately 48% of Poland's pre-war territory, to the Soviet Union is seen by Poles as another "betrayal" by their Western "Allies".

According to many historians, Churchill and Roosevelt promised Stalin to settle the issue with the Poles, however they never sincerely informed the Polish side. When the Prime Minister of the Polish government-in-exile Stanisław Mikołajczyk attended the Moscow Conference (1944), he was convinced he was coming to discuss borders that were still disputed, while Stalin believed everything had already been settled. This was the principal reason for the failure of the Polish Prime Minister's mission to Moscow. The Polish premier allegedly begged for inclusion of Lwów and Wilno in the new Polish borders, but got the following reply from Vyacheslav Molotov: "There is no use discussing that; it was all settled in Teheran."[27]

Warsaw Uprising

See: Lack of outside support in the Warsaw Uprising for more info on the Allied policy towards Poland during the Uprising.

Since the establishment of the Polish government in exile in Paris and then in London, the military commanders of the Polish army were focusing most of their efforts on preparation of a future all-national uprising against Germany. Finally, the plans for Operation Tempest were prepared and on August 1, 1944 the Warsaw Uprising started. The Uprising was an armed struggle by the Polish Home Army to liberate Warsaw from German occupation and Nazi rule.

Despite the fact that Polish and later Royal Air Force (RAF) planes flew missions over Warsaw dropping supplies from 4 August on, the United States Air Force (USAF) planes did not join the operation. The Allies specifically requested the use of Red Army airfields near Warsaw on 20 August but were refused by Stalin on 22 August (he referred to the insurgents as 'a handful of criminals'). After Stalin's objections to support for the uprising, Churchill telegrammed Roosevelt on 25 August and proposed sending planes in defiance of Stalin and to 'see what happens'. Roosevelt replied on 26 August that I do not consider it advantageous to the long-range general war prospect for me to join you in the proposed message to Uncle Joe.[28] The commander of the British air drop, Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, later stated, "How, after the fall of Warsaw, any responsible statesman could trust the Russian Communist further than he could kick him, passes the comprehension of ordinary men."

Various scholars (including Norman Davies in his recently published Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw) argue that during the Warsaw Uprising both the governments of United Kingdom and the United States did little to help Polish insurgents and that the Allies put little pressure on Stalin to help the Polish struggle.

Yalta

See also: Yalta conference.

In 1945, Poland's borders were redrawn following the decision made at the Tehran Conference of 1943 at the insistence of the Soviet Union. The Polish government was not invited to the talks and was to be notified of their outcome. Polish representatives did present arguments concerning borders at the Potsdam conference, however, and Polish demands for German territory were agreed to. The eastern territories which the Soviet Union had occupied in 1939 (with the exception of the Białystok area) were permanently annexed, and most of their Polish inhabitants expelled: today these territories are part of Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania. The factual basis of this decision was the result of a forged referendum from November 1939 in which the "huge majority" of voters accepted the incorporation of these lands into Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. In compensation, Poland was given former German territory (the so-called Regained Territories): the southern half of East Prussia and all of Pomerania and Silesia, up to the Oder-Neisse Line. The German population of these territories was expelled and these territories were subsequently repopulated with Poles expelled from the eastern regions. This combined with other similar migrations in Central and Eastern Europe to form one of the largest human migrations in modern times. Stalin ordered Polish resistance fighters to be either incarcerated or deported to gulags in Siberia.

Many Poles believe that Western leaders tried to force Polish leaders to accept the conditions of Stalin. Some view it as a 'betrayal' of Poland by its Western allies (which can be seen as part of a larger 'betrayal' to 'allow' it to fall entirely into the Soviet sphere of influence). Moreover, it was used by ruling communists to underline anti-Western sentiments.[29][30] It was easy to argue that Poland was not very important to the West, since Allied leaders sacrificed Polish borders, legal government and free elections.[31][32][33]

With this background, even Stalin looked like a better friend of Poland, since he did have strong interests in Poland. The Federal Republic of Germany, formed in 1949, was portrayed by Communist propaganda as the breeder of Hitler's posthumous offspring who desired retaliation and wanted to take back from Poland the "Recovered Territories".[34] Giving this picture a grain of creditability was the fact that Federal Republic of Germany until 1970 refused to recognize the Oder-Neisse Line and the fact that some West German officials had a tainted Nazi past. Thus, for a segment of Polish public opinion, Communist rule was seen as the lesser of the two evils.

Defenders of the actions taken by the Western allies maintain that Realpolitik made it impossible to do anything else, and that they were in no shape to start an utterly un-winnable war with the Soviet Union over the subjugation of Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries immediately after the end of World War II. Some argue that the actions of the Secretary of State were a result of ignorance rather than Realpolitik.Template:Fact It could be contended that the presence of a double standard with respect to Nazi and Soviet aggression existed in 1939 and 1940, when the Soviets invaded eastern Poland, and then the Baltic States, and then Finland, and yet the Western Allies failed to declare war.

What the Western allies sacrificed is also disputed. Some argue that Poland's borders had been re-drawn many times in history, the country had not had free elections since 1926 and throughout the 1930s it had endured increasing political repression under an authoritarian Sanacja government. On the other hand, the Polish government in exile was composed entirely of the pre-war democratic opposition and all political parties of the Polish Secret State underlined the need to follow the democratic traditions of March 1921 constitution, rather than the autocratic April constitution of Poland of 1935.

In May 2005 US President George W. Bush admitted that the Soviet domination of central and eastern Europe after World War II was "one of the greatest wrongs of history" and acknowledged that the United States played a significant role in the division of the continent and that the Yalta conference "followed in the unjust tradition of Munich and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. (...) Once again, when powerful governments negotiated, the freedom of small nations was somehow expendable."Template:Fact.

The chief American negotiator at Yalta was Alger Hiss, later convicted of perjury for lying to the House Committee on Unamerican Activities on whether he was spying for the Soviets. He was, however, never convicted of espionage itself and his ultimate guilt or innocence remains disputed to this day.

Aftermath

Władysław Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile, was killed in an air crash over Gibraltar in July 1943. As he was the most prestigious leader of the Polish exiles, his death was a severe setback to the Polish cause, and was certainly highly convenient for Stalin. It was in some ways also convenient for the western Allies, who were finding the Polish issue a stumbling-block in their efforts to preserve good relations with Stalin.

This has given rise to persistent suggestions that Sikorski's death was not accidental. Many historians speculate that his death might have been effect of Soviet, British or even Polish conspiracy. This has never been proved, and the fact that the principal exponents of this theory in the west have been the revisionist historians David Irving and Rolf Hochhuth has not encouraged many western historians to take it seriously. The issue may not be settled until the release of UK intelligence archives in another "50 to 100 years." Template:Fact

In November 1944, despite his mistrust of the Soviets, Sikorski's successor, Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk resigned to return to Poland and take office in the new government established under the auspices of the Soviet occupation authorities. Many of the Polish exiles opposed this action, believing that this government was a facade for the establishment of Communist rule in Poland, a view that was later proved correct; after losing an election which was later shown to have been fraudulent, Mikołajczyk left Poland again in 1947.

Meanwhile the government in exile had maintained its existence, but the United States and the United Kingdom withdrew their recognition on July 6, 1945. The Polish armed forces in exile [officially Polish Armed Forces under British Command] were disbanded in 1947.

Out of approximately 265,000 Polish armied forces in the West in 1945, only 105,000 returned to Poland, but close to 160,000 stayed in Western (mostly British) territory.

The total number of Poles who were demobilised from the Polish Armed Forces:

  • 114,000 Polish Resettlement Corps [PRC]
  • 86,000 Returned to Poland from United Kingdom
  • 12,000 Returned to Poland from Italy
  • 5,000 Returned to Poland from Germany
  • 2,000 Returned to Poland from Middle East
  • 8,000 Disbanded without joining PRC
  • 1,000 "Recalcitrants" ineligible for PRC
  • 14,000 Repatriated to countries other than Poland
  • 7,000 Settled in France
  • 249,000 Total[35]

The London Poles had to leave the embassy on Portland Place and were left only with the president's private residence at 43 Eaton Place. The government in exile then became largely symbolic, serving mainly to symbolise the continued resistance to foreign occupation of Poland, and retaining control of some important archives from pre-war Poland. Ireland and Spain were the last countries to recognize the government in exile.

Originally the British Government invited representatives of the newly recognised regime in Warsaw to march in the 1946 victory parade in London but the delegation from Poland never arrived – the reason was never adequately explained, pressure from Moscow being the most likely. Bowing to press and public pressure, the British eventually invited representatives of the Polish Air Force under British Command to attend in their place. They in turn refused to attend in protest at similar invitations not being extended to the Polish Army and Navy. In resulting humiliation the only representative of fourth largest allied military at the parade was Colonel Jozef Kuropieska – the military attaché of the Communist regime in Warsaw. [36]

At the war's end many of these feelings of resentment were capitalized on by the occupying Soviets, who used them to reinforce anti-Western sentiments within Poland. Propaganda was produced by Communists to show Russia as the Great Liberator, and the West as the Great Traitor. Moscow's Pravda reported in February 1944 that all Poles who valued Poland's honour and independence were marching with the "Union of Polish Patriots" in the USSR.[37] Capitalism was shown as being inherently bad, because capitalists only cared for "their own skin", while communism was portrayed as the great "uniter and protector".

Russia

In the final days of the war, masses of refugees from Nazi-abandoned Russia and Croatia were fleeing from the Red Army and Tito's partisans. In Operation Keelhaul, British troops gathered these thousands of refugees in Austria including Cossacks, Ustase, Croatian and White Russian troops, and civilians. The Soviet and Russian citizens were turned to Soviet-occupied Germany, where in many cases they were summarily shot. The Western powers had not undertaken any international commitment about these individuals.Template:Fact

Spain

A similar feeling occurred among the supporters of the Second Spanish Republic. During the Spanish Civil War, the democratic countries had taken to neutrality instead of supporting the democratically-elected republic against the rebels supported by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. At most, the people of France, Belgium and Britain took refugee children, and some foreign volunteers, mostly leftists, joined the International Brigades. Only the Soviet Union, Poland and Mexico offered limited military help to the Republic.

To this perception, they added the treatment of republican soldiers that fled to France who were secluded in harsh concentration camps.

During the Second World War, many of the former republican soldiers joined the French Resistance and the Free French Forces, expecting that the next step after allied victory would be the defeat of Francoist Spain. However, the Allies did not invade Spain. It was just left alone in autarky.

The entry of Spain in the United Nations and the visit of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower to Spain dispelled any hope of Western action against Franco.

Baltic states

Although many Poles feel betrayed by a lack of aggressiveness with which the western allies pursued the war against their invaders, the western allies did maintain their commitments to declare war on Germany. For the Baltic States, however, who also had their fate sealed by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939, the western allies failed to take up the defence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania when the Soviet Union invaded in 1940 as they had for Poland in 1939. On the other hand, France and Britain had no formal, legal commitments with regard to the Baltic States.

Memel Territory

The Memel territory was separated from German East Prussia in 1920, and put under French administration. The area had been conquered by the Teutonic Order in the Middle Ages, and had belonged to Prussia for at least 500 years. It was inhabited by Germans as the largest part of the populationTemplate:Fact, while a quarter declared itself Lithuanian, and another quarter, as local Memelländer and/or Klaipedians depending on language.

In 1923, Lithuanian forces occupied the area during what is called the Klaipeda revolt. The French forces put up a token resistance and left, and later the annexation of the area now called the Klaipeda region by Lithuania was confirmed by the International Community. This was considered a Western betrayal by many, especially by France who did not protect autonomy either with their troops, or by diplomacy Template:Fact. Also, when the government of the Weimar Republic agreed to the annexation in 1928, it was also considered a betrayal by many Germans, by their own government.

Yugoslavia

At the Tehran Conference in November 1943, a decision was made by the Allies to cease their support of the Royalist Chetniks, and switch allegiances to Josip Broz Tito's communist Yugoslav National Liberation Army.

The West (primarily the UK) had supported the Yugoslav monarchy, allowing the exiled King to settle in London and providing assistance to the Chetniks via RAF and Special Operations Executive (SOE) prior to 1943. The people of Yugoslavia, however, had by and large already abandoned it, given how the kingdom deteriorated after the death of King Aleksandar and especially how it crumbled in March and April 1941 when the Axis Powers invaded it. Therefore it would be difficult to speak of a Western betrayal of Yugoslavia in the context of 1940s and later decades.

Supporters of the Chetniks contend that if the Allies maintained their assistance support for their cause, the Karageorgeovich family would have restored to the Yugoslav throne. This argument has been the subject of considerable controversy. Opponents of this viewpoint have argued that the Allies had no other choice then to sever their support for the Chetniks as the Chetniks were collaborating with the Axis while the Partisans were resisting the Axis.

Notes and references

Footnotes

  1. http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1342,title,Jalta-symbolem-zdrady-aliantow-wobec-Polski,wid,6624250,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=18594
  2. http://web.ku.edu/~eceurope/hist557/BiblPt2.htm
  3. "FRENCH AND BRITISH BETRAYAL OF POLAND IN 1939". http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/History/polandbetrayal.htm. 
  4. http://www.polishresistance-ak.org/20%20Article.htm
  5. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,808812,00.html
  6. http://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/articles/view/2339
  7. http://www.ww2.pl/The,underground,home,army,25.html
  8. http://www.ww2.pl/Polish,Army,on,the,Eastern,Front,24.html
  9. http://books.google.com/books?ie=UTF-8&vid=ISBN0850454174&id=AAdYFeW2fnoC&pg=PA26&lpg=PA26&dq=first+polish+army&vq=counter-government&sig=qPA6i-Gms1D-8JEiRw58CNeDmvc#PPA26,M1
  10. http://www.ww2.pl/Polish,contribution,to,the,Allied,victory,in,World,War,2,(1939-1945),132.html
  11. http://www.ww2.pl/Polish,contribution,to,the,Allied,victory,in,World,War,2,(1939-1945),132.html
  12. http://www.angelfire.com/ok2/polisharmy/chapter1.html
  13. http://www.1st-mac.com/
  14. http://www.randomhouse.com/boldtype/0797/radzinsky/excerpt.html
  15. (English) Andrew Rothstein (1980). The Soldiers' Strikes of 1919. Basingstoke: Macmillan Publishing. pp. 35. ISBN 0333276930. http://books.google.com/books?id=wDQaAAAAMAAJ&visbn=0333276930&dq=The+Soldiers'+Strikes&q=&pgis=1#search. 
  16. Arthur Harris used the same phrase in 1945 and the historian Frederick Taylor on page 432 in Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945 mentions that it was a deliberate echo of a famous sentence used by Bismarck "The whole of the Balkans is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier."
  17. Shaw, 1973, p.101
  18. (English) various authors (1961 (1974)). "Upper Silesia, Poland, and the Baltic States, January 1920–March 1921 <333". in Rohan Butler, J.P.T. Bury, M.E. Lambert. Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939. 1st. XI. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. ISBN 0-11-591511-7. 
  19. (Polish) Tadeusz Jędruszczak (1984). Plebiscyt i trzecie powstanie śląskie. Historia Polski. IV. Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences. ISBN 83-01-003865-9. 
  20. (Polish) Andrzej Ajnenkiel (2000). Polsko-francuski sojusz wojskowy. Warsaw: Akademia Obrony Narodowej. 
  21. (Polish) Jan Ciałowicz (1971). Polsko-francuski sojusz wojskowy, 1921–1939. Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe. 
  22. (English) Count Edward Raczyński (1948). The British-Polish Alliance; Its Origin and Meaning. London: The Mellville Press. 
  23. (English) Stephen Borsody (1994). The New Central Europe. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 1-882785-03-7. http://www.hungarian-history.hu/lib/newce/. 
  24. (English) Charles E. Bohlen (1973). Witness to history, 1929-1969. Norton. pp. 562. ISBN 978-0393074765. 
  25. [1] World War II timeline for 1939
  26. [2] German Chronik des Seekriegs
  27. The Fruits of Teheran, TIME Magazine, December 25, 1944
  28. http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/presents/shows/warsaw.rising/interactive/timeline.warsaw/frameset.exclude.html
  29. (English) Samuel Leonard Sharp (1953). Poland, white eagle on a red field. Harvard: Harvard University Press. pp. 163. http://books.google.com/books?id=xtceAAAAMAAJ&vid=OCLC01457011&dq=Yalta+free+elections+Poland&q=betrayal&pgis=1#search. 
  30. (English) Norman Davies (2005 [1982]). God's Playground. 2. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-12819-3. 
  31. (English) Howard Jones (2001). Crucible of Power: a history of U.S. foreign relations since 1897. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 205–207. ISBN 0842029184. http://books.google.com/books?visbn=0842029184&id=n6Al88smOAUC&pg=PA207&lpg=PA207&ots=ifNDYJ7z_Y&dq=Yalta+free+elections+Poland&sig=6fllW8jCLI-QEifsfDX0XFTZ2Vk#PPA207,M1. 
  32. (English) various authors (1948). "A compilation of selected resolutions, declarations, memorials, memorandums,..". Selected Documents (Chicago, IL: Polish American Congress) (1244-1248): 112. http://books.google.com/books?id=x5brwE5vmlwC&vid=OCLC05523398&dq=Yalta+free+elections+Poland&q=AS+A+PARTY+TO+THE+YALTA+AGREEMENT+THAT+CRUSHED&pgis=1#search. 
  33. Sharp, op.cit., p.12
  34. "Poland under Stalinism", _Poznan in June 1956: A Rebellious City_, The Wielkopolska Museum of the Fight for Independence in Poznan, 2006, p. 5
  35. Dr Mark Ostrowski To Return To Poland Or Not To Return" - The Dilemma Facing The Polish Armed Forces At The End Of The Second World War.Chapter 8
  36. Dr Mark Ostrowski Op.Cit Chapter 1
  37. Dr Mark Ostrowski Op.Cit. Chapter 6

Notations

  • Nicholas Bethell, The War Hitler Won: The Fall of Poland, September 1939, New York, 1972.
  • Mieczyslaw B. Biskupski The history of Poland Westport, CT; London: Greenwood Press, 2000.
  • Russell D. Buhite Decisions at Yalta: an appraisal of summit diplomacy, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1986.
  • Anna M. Cienciala "Poland in British and French policy in 1939: determination to fight — or avoid war?" pages 413–433 from The Origins of The Second World War edited by Patrick Finney, Arnold, London, 1997.
  • Anna M. Cienciala and Titus Komarnicki From Versailles to Locarno: keys to Polish foreign policy, 1919–25, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1984.
  • Richard Crampton Eastern Europe in the twentieth century — and after London; New York: Routledge, 1997.
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  • Sean Greenwood "The Phantom Crisis: Danzig, 1939" pages 247–272 from The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered: A.J.P. Taylor and the Historians edited by Gordon Martel Routledge Inc, London, United Kingdom, 1999.
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  • Margaret Olwen Macmillan Paris 1919: six months that changed the world New York: Random House, 2003, 2002, 2001.
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  • David Martin, Patriot or Traitor: The Case of General Mihailovich. Hoover Institution, Stanford, 1978. ISBN 0-8179-6911-X.
  • David Martin, The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, San Diego & New York, 1990. ISBN 0-15-180704-3
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  • Daniel Johnson, Betrayed by the Big Three. Daily Telegraph, London, November 8, 2003
  • Diana Kuprel, How the Allies Betrayed Warsaw. Globe and Mail, Toronto, February 7, 2004
  • Ari Shaltiel, The Great Betrayal. Haaretz, Tel Aviv, February 23, 2004

See also

External links


Quotes

Up to date as of January 14, 2010

From Wikiquote

Western betrayal or Yalta betrayal are popular terms in many Central European countries, especially in Poland and the Czech Republic but also in non-Western nations which refers to the foreign policy of several Western countries which violated allied pacts and agreements during the period from the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 through World War II and to the Cold War, as rooted in hypocrisy and betrayal.

About the Western betrayal concept:

Quotes

* and so in the evening released from facts I can think
about distant ancient matters for example our
friends beyond the sea I know they sincerely sympathize
they send us flour lard sacks of comfort and good advice
they don't even know their fathers betrayed us
our former allies at the time of the second Apocalypse
their sons are blameless they deserve our gratitude therefore we are grateful
they have not experienced a siege as long as eternity
those struck by misfortune are always alone
the defenders of the Dalai Lama the Kurds the Afghan mountaineers

-- from Zbigniew Herbert's poem Report from the Besieged City

  • It is said that by doing that [i.e abandoning Eastern Europe] they secured the imminent participation of Stalin in war against Japan. Already armed with the Atomic bomb, they did pay for Stalin so that he wouldn’t refuse to occupy Mandzhuria, to help Mao Zedong to gain power in China and Kim Ir Sen in half of Korea!… Oh, misery of political calculation! When later Mikolajczyk was expelled, when the end of Benesh and Masaryk came, Berlin was blocked, Budapest was in flames and turned silent, when ruins fumed in Korea and when the conservatives fleed from Suez – didn’t really some of those who had better memory recall for instance the case of giving away the cossacks?

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, Part I, ch 6 (‘That Spring’)

External links

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